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One of the key values associated with social interaction is tolerance. The no-
tion of a tolerant dialogue presupposes the use of a ‘language of consent’, as 
opposed to ‘speech of hatred’. Tolerance, regarded as a lingua-culture-logical 
and lingua-pragmatic category, is seen as a type of verbal interaction, as op-
posed to verbal aggression. Linguists define the term ‘speech of hatred’ as 
“language and speech resources, including structuring principles, which gen-
erate negative stereotypes derived from mass consciousness, supported by the 
recipient's hostile attitude toward someone or something” (quoted according 
to Chepkina 2006). Most commentators agree that the degree of tolerance in 
a society depends on the nature and extent of the language of tolerance of that 
society.
Language serves as an instrument of social power. Discursive expression of 
any kind of power, including political, is manifested in a system of commu-
nication between different actors. The political sphere is one of the principal 
areas of communication. Researchers see the specific features of politics in its 
discursive nature: “Many political actions are by nature speech acts.” If one 
assumes that “people enter into one or another discursive space, not only in a 
particular social role [...] but with certain objectives, then the intentional basis 
of political discourse is a power struggle” (Sheigal 2004, p. 16, 18). This prag-
matic factor that distinguishes political discourse from a series of other insti-
tutional discourses, can be considered as a means of social interaction, but can 
also serve as a basis for social conflict. This conclusion proceeds logically 
from the very nature of political communication, the content of which consists 
of three major components: “the articulation of the political position (orienta-
tion), the search for and rallying of supporters (integration), the fight with the 
enemy (agonality)” (Sheigal 2004, p. 112).
Contradictions and conflicts arise in almost all spheres of human life, includ-
ing the political sphere, and communication in politics is always biased, affec-
tive. However, researchers have noted an increased aggressiveness in modern 
political speech, with the active use of confrontational strategies and tactics in 
verbal behaviour. Relatedly, it is important to emphasise that the nature of po-
litical communication, in contrast to other types of institutional communica-
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tion, lies in its orientation to a mass addressee. Indeed, it is as a result of the 
mass media, which act as an intermediary between the politicians and people, 
that political discourse exists at all, in its modern form. Yet most researchers 
agree that despite the common language that much mass communication 
shares, in most political discourse realised through the media, there is varia-
tion due to the heterogeneity of the subjects themselves, according to the ori-
entation of their policies. Each subject group has its own political culture, 
based on its system of values and norms, although the ultimate goal of all par-
ticipants in the political space is a struggle for power. In other words, it makes 
sense to talk about political sociolects or, in other words, the “socio-cultural 
version of socio-political speech” (Sheigal 2004, p. 237f.).
Kazakhstan's political discourse is represented by the socio-cultural variations 
of the party in power and the opposition, the discursive manifestation of which 
are the official and oppositional discourses. The presence of these variants, 
each with their own internal varieties, is explained by the fact that the politi-
cal space consists of, according to Sheigal, ‘power politicians’ and ‘opposition 
ones’. There are particular reasons to talk in general about ‘politicians in op-
position’ in Kazakhstan politics, because as recently as October 2009, leaders 
of two leading opposition parties in Kazakhstan, ‘Azat’ and PUSD, announced 
their merger: Объединенная партия “станет мощной и действенной 
альтернативой партии власти” (‘The newly combined party will become 
a powerful and effective alternative to the party in power’, Svoboda Slova, 
15.10.2009). Each sociolect claims to be the mouthpiece of truth about the 
modern socio-political situation in the country. Arutyunova points out several 
utterances, all seemingly intended to be truth-bearing, where the meanings are 
in fact relative, dependent on the addressee: “true candour, personally per-
ceived truth), objective truth” (Arutyunova 1999, p. 598). Following this ter-
minology, we can say that “objective truth” describes more characteristics of 
oppositional discourse. The realm of ‘truthful directness’ does not only in-
clude facts but also opinions and evaluations which can be clearly seen in the 
discourse of the opposition.
In the verbal behaviour of representatives of relevant sociolects, the thematic 
structure of the discourses is determined by the system of values and norms in-
herent in the social group. There is no doubt that in political communication the 
connection of the language with the basic cultural opposition ‘friend or foe’ is 
most clearly realised. All other values derive from this opposition. As can be 
seen in our time, especially in times of crisis, the actualisation of this opposi-
tion does not allow speaking about harmonisation of relations in our society. In 
the modern discursive political space, a particular form of the ideological cate-
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gory of tolerance, namely tolerance of ‘us’ and the rejection of ‘foreigners’, is 
clearly displayed. In describing ‘our circle’, as a rule, any differences in the atti-
tudes, approaches, or points of view of its participants are erased. This ap-
proach is seen universally, so that expressions of tolerance or intolerance al-
ways relate to this paradigm. Connected to this, generally speaking the verbal 
organisation of the propositional content of various types of information, the 
choice of presuppositions, the selection of certain words, phrases, or grammati-
cal forms, are identified by linguists as instruments of ‘hidden power’.
This problem fits into the context of a more general problem: the relationship 
between language of power and the power of language. On the one hand, “lan-
guage becomes power only when it is used by people in power; language itself 
has no power” (Vodak 1997, p. 19). In this connection, reference may be made 
to the opinion of R. Blakar that whoever wields the highest authority may 
decide at any given time whether current linguistic usage is appropriate or not, 
therefore, whoever has the power to a large extent determines the use and 
meaning of the language (‘power tools’, in Blakar 1987, p. 113). Thus, in offi-
cial discourse a few years ago, the noun phrase ‘управляемая демократия’ 
(‘managed democracy’) became widespread and was introduced into Kazakh-
stan's everyday political life by President Nazarbayev. In oppositional dis-
course, this connotation of a scale of democratic values appears in an oppos-
ing sense: Эти слова свидетельствуют, что ‘управляемая демократия’ 
по казахстанскому варианту достигла своей высшей стадии (‘These 
words confirm that the Kazakhstani version of a ‘managed democracy’ has 
reached its peak.’) (Respublika). Another example concerns the initiation of 
a construction metaphor in the discussion of international economics: наша 
страна готова активно участвовать [...] в формировании новой миро-
вой архитектуры; Казахстан всегда был и остается площадкой для 
диалога (‘our country is ready to actively participate in forming a new world 
architecture; Kazakhstan has always been and remains a platform for dia-
logue’). Used in the address of the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazar-
baev, to the participants of VIII Media Forum, it was immediately seized by 
the forum and activated in their speeches: активно работать над выстраи-
ванием архитектуры будущей мировой финансовой системы; Такое не-
ординарное видение строительства посткризисного мира; атмосфера 
Алмаатинской диалоговой площадки; эффективность диалоговой пло-
щадки (‘to work hard at creating the architecture of a future world financial 
system; such an unusual vision of building a post-crisis world; the atmosphere 
of the Almaty dialogue platform; the effectiveness of a platform for dialogue’, 
Kaz.pravda 107-108, 2009).
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On the other hand, the language itself provides a whole arsenal of potential 
expressions of the exercise of power. Political communication demonstrates 
how certain features of language are deliberately activated in order to influ-
ence mass and individual consciousness and behaviour. It is common for both 
the official and oppositional types of political communication speech acts ‘to 
tell the truth’. However, both types of discourse are characterised by the substi-
tution of opinion for fact. The field of opinions is characterised by discursive 
features that lack clear boundaries, such as evaluations, assumptions, predic-
tions, beliefs and attitudes. In the media texts analysed for this study they appear 
in most cases in the form of evaluative opinions or assumptions. These features 
can be seen in terms of the framework of ideological modality, which, according 
to T.G. Dobrosklonskaya, “reveals that such evaluations are most often founded 
on political opinions and ideological values” (Dobrosklonskaya 2009, p. 86).
This is demonstrated if we look in detail at some of the remarks of the official 
and oppositional discourses: (1) Казахстан сумел грамотно распорядить-
ся средствами (‘Kazakhstan used the resources competently’). (2) Казахс-
тан всегда был и остается площадкой для диалога (‘Kazakhstan has al-
ways been and remains a platform for dialogue’). (3) Несомненно, этому 
помогают личные контакты между главами двух государств (‘Undoubt-
edly personal contacts between the leaders of the two states contribute to it’, 
Каз.pravda 107-108, 2009). (4) Наша власть не выдерживает проверку 
кризисом (‘Our power is not borne out by the crisis’, Svoboda Slova 19, 2009). 
(5) Все возможности, имевшиеся у этого режима, уже исчерпаны (‘All 
options available to this regime have already been exhausted’). (6) Мы увере-
ны, что ряды объединенной партии будут (‘We are sure the rows of the 
united party will be’, Svoboda Slova 38, 2009). In (1), (2), (4) and (5), an 
evaluative opinion is expressed, as also in (3) and (6) but with a higher degree 
of confidence, as seen in the use of the high probability modality of ‘undoubt-
edly’ and ‘sure’. The opinion score for both sociolects suggests that they assert 
subjective truth. If the views expressed were explicitly acknowledged as per-
sonal experience, or if a source of evidence for the claims were cited, matters 
might be improved. However, the authors consider it unnecessary: they con-
sider their propositions to be true. The modality of opinion in political dis-
course, as Matveyev rightly asserts, should be understood not as a category 
statement, but as illocutionary modality, i.e. as a means of expressing the au-
thor's intentions (Matveyev 2002).
It is important to mention the special role of noun phrases in the creation of 
necessity modality for certain subject groups in the discourse: the manipula-
tion of NPs demonstrates just as strongly as previous examples the power of 
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language to impose a subjective outlook. Nominal choices can indicate author 
values. Thus, in the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan's speech at the 
XII session of the People's Assembly of Kazakhstan, it is not a random selec-
tion of evaluative words that attracts one's attention, but rather the following 
NPs: надежный/прочный фундамент, конструктивное решение, весомый 
вклад, уникальный опыт, впечатляющий успех, самый высокий в СНГ, 
мощный экономический подъем, грамотная/взвешенная политика, взве-
шенное и мудрое поведение, самый либеральный язык (‘a reliable, steady 
foundation’, ‘a constructive decision’, ‘significant contribution’, ‘a unique ex-
perience’, ‘impressive success’, ‘the highest in the CIS’, ‘powerful increase in 
economic development’, ‘competent/weighty policy’, ‘weighty and wise con-
duct’, ‘the most liberal language’) As we can see, the opinion-score in this 
case is based not so much on the traditional ‘good-bad’ axis, but taking into 
consideration such arguments as ‘the primary-secondary’.
Both the official and oppositional discourses employ the lexical set of corpo-
rate affairs. Political actors, regardless of their party group membership, make 
use of such key words and phrases as власть, политика, демократия, ста-
бильность, единство, прогресс, интересы государства, простой народ, 
в интересах народа etc. (‘power’, ‘policy’, ‘democracy’, ‘stability’, ‘unity’, 
‘progress’, ‘the interests of the state’, ‘ordinary people’, ‘in the people's inter-
ests’, etc.), and recently the word кризис (crisis) has been added to this list. 
The differences between variants of socio-political speech lie in the conno-
tative characteristics of the same tokens, and in their syntagmatic relations. 
In this respect, the term ‘ideological polysemy’, introduced by linguists to 
describe a situation where the same words are in use by representatives of dif-
ferent ideologies, proves to be very apt for indicating the different concepts 
referred to by the same tokens. “Ideological polysemy is the result of a group 
of connotations, expressing interpretations of political reality from the stand-
point of different social groups.” (Sheigal 2004, p. 51).
All the keywords in use in political discourse are in opposition to connotative 
labelling, which is confirmed by the analysis and word-ideology. Thus, in of-
ficial discourse – стабильность (stability) is one of the key words. – Это 
наше главное завоевание, это наше Все. Казахстан является лидером 
развития и гарантом стабильности в Центральной Азии. (‘This is our 
main gain; it is all ours. Kazakhstan is leading regional development and a 
guarantee of stability in Central Asia’.) In the discourse of the opposition, we 
find instead дестабилизация (‘destabilization’). Или стабильность кор-
рупции, стабильность бедности; всепоглощающая стабильность (‘cor-
rupt stability’, ‘the stability of power’, ‘overwhelming stability’). Though such 
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statements do not belong to the specialised verbal signs of integration, they do 
invite that association, that is, identify themselves with a certain audience, ap-
pealing to the feelings and mood of a particular social group. Many linguists 
emphasise common language acts as a powerful means of creating group 
solidarity.
The contexts of such key words as ‘democracy’ have positive connotations in 
the official discourse: Казахстан продолжает движение по пути демок-
ратии, продвижение демократии, сильное демократическое государс-
тво, демократия – это ‘диктатура закона’ (‘Kazakhstan is continuing its 
progress towards democracy’, ‘democratic advance’, ‘a strong democratic 
state’, ‘democracy is ‘the dictatorship of law’’). The subjects of oppositional 
discourse speak of эрзац-демократии (‘ersatz-democracy’). They perceive 
‘democracy’ as средство камуфляжа, as ширму, одно из средств маски-
ровки истинных намерений (‘a means of camouflage’; ‘a screen’, ‘a means 
of concealing true intentions’, Svoboda Slova). The conclusion reached by 
oppositional forces on the topic of democracy is: читайте и думайте, нуж-
на ли нам такая демократия (‘read and think: ask yourself whether we need 
such democracy’). The addressees are invited to draw their own conclusion 
(читайте и думайте) (‘read and think’), but according to the author, the 
conclusion must be unambiguous: такая – не нужна (‘it is not necessary’). 
The addresser uses symbols and signs of integration and otherness: the token 
нам opposed by the deictic такая (‘such’), creates a distancing effect. At the 
same time, the oppositional sociolect has positioned itself as объединенная 
демократическая оппозиция, здоровые силы (‘united democratic opposi-
tion’, ‘healthy forces’). So we can see that commitment to democracy is ex-
pressed in a variety of ways in different discourse types.
According to Sheigal's definition, connotatively loaded signs may serve as 
political indicators, functioning as passwords, demonstrating commitment to 
a particular ideology (Sheigal 2004, p. 106-108).
Власть (‘power’) belongs to the basic set of concepts within political discourse. 
Власть (‘power’) becomes the object of reflection; it is subjected to reflection, 
interpretation and criticism; one can speak about it abstractly and generally, as 
well as concretely, specifically, as in ‘those who hold authority’. But this con-
cept is undergoing semantic expansion, through the inclusion of associated 
ideas, and it seems that native speakers respond primarily to the associative 
semantic elements in the term. These elements appear in synonymous and 
compatible terms, cliches, and new, imaginative formulations. In a similar 
way to ‘democracy’, discussed above, observations show that the high fre-
quency use of this term has different semantic values in oppositional discourse, 
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which is understandable. Power is always a relationship between actors: those 
who have it, and those who do not. Therefore, the subject of power, its real 
owner, seeks to preserve it, but the object can either be a supporter of it, or 
he or she may be in opposition to the government. In the discourse of the op-
position, oppositional values are clearly expressed: власть – народ, обще-
ство: Если бы тогда эта идея была принята обществом и властью [...] 
(‘Power is people, society. If that idea had been accepted by the society and 
those in power at that time [...]’, Svoboda Slova 11, 2009).The combinator-
ics of the tokens in the opposition discourse testify to its ideological purpose, 
displaying an absence of positive assessment: прямое порождение власти, 
беспредел власти, разборки во власти, продукты власти, Власть явля-
ется инструментом для реализации своих идей, амбиций и даже корыс-
тных интересов. Они пришли в город, а нарвались на баррикады власти 
(‘a direct outcome of power’; ‘the lawlessness of power’; ‘power struggles’; 
‘the fruits of power’. ‘Power is a means of realising ideas, ambitions and even 
selfish interests’. ‘They came to town but were stopped by the barricades of 
power’). It becomes clear that ‘power’ can refer to political domination, to the 
organs that sustain it, and also to specific representatives of political power. 
Only in the discourse of the opposition is the word режим applied as a syn-
onym for власть (‘power’) in full accordance with its dictionary definition as 
‘the system of government, usually of an anti-national, anti-democratic na-
ture’, Ozhegov/Shvedova 2003, p. 673). Тот режим, который мы сейчас 
критикуем, уже состоялся как система. Все возможности, имевшиеся у 
этого режима, уже исчерпаны. [...] Почему режим боится этих выбо-
ров? (‘The regime we are criticising has established itself as a system. All the 
regime's options have been exhausted. Why is the regime afraid of these elec-
tions?’, Svoboda Slova 38, 2009). The ideological connotations of this token are 
indicated by its compatibility with the following: авторитарный, антинарод-
ный, семейно-клановый (‘authoritarian’, ‘anti-national’, and ‘family-clan’).
In both the discourse of the party in power and that of the opposition, such 
conceptual metaphorical means of manipulating people's consciousness are 
widely used. This kind of use of metaphor is a vivid example of covert advo-
cacy of certain ideas, and the transition to a veiled manipulation of mass con-
sciousness.The property of ‘imposing’ a specific view of the world on a certain 
language speaker, inviting them to perceive reality from a certain perspective, 
is attributable to the metaphor. Different political sociolects use different met-
aphors. In opposition discourse the development of metaphorical models with 
conceptual images of ‘войны’, ‘криминального мира’, ‘болезни’, ‘театра’ 
(‘war’, ‘criminal world’, ‘diseases’ and ‘theatre’) is seen. The concept война 
(‘war’) is developed by association with информационная (‘information’). In 
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this situation criminal and military metaphors are combined, with the follow-
ing occurring in one linguistic instance: информационное оружие, инфор-
мационная бомба, информационная блокада, информационный киллер, 
телекиллер, информационные стволы (‘information weapon’, ‘information 
bomb’, ‘information blockade’, ‘information killer’, ‘TV killer’, ‘information 
guns’). After well-known events, the image of майдан (‘square’) was intro-
duced into the discursive space of Kazakhstan's media, and was used by politi-
cians in the metaphorical sense as confrontation (between the government and 
opposition). This metaphor is closely related to the милитарной (‘military’) 
model: Неизвестно, ждет ли площади Алма-Аты и Астаны судьба киев-
ского майдана? (‘It is unknown whether the squares in Astana and Almaty 
will follow the fate of Kiev square’, Juma-Times). In the discourse of the Ka-
zakhstan Media, a new conceptual image has begun to be used with both the 
literal Kazakh meaning of the word, and its connotative sense, майдан: Если 
власть мирится со своими недостатками, не может их исправить или 
не хочет, тогда – майдан. В Украине это – ‘площадь’, а в наших широ-
тах – обязательно ‘фронт’. Поэтому доводить страну до майдана не 
надо (‘If the ruling powers persist in their shortcomings, fail to correct them 
or do not wish to do so, then it means: square. In the Ukraine it is ‘square’, but 
there it is bound to be a ‘front’. That's why we shouldn't lead the country to it’, 
AIF-Kazakhstan).
In the discourse of power, we frequently see personifying metaphors reworking 
the conceptual image of движение, развитие, рост (‘movement’, ‘devel-
opment’, ‘growth’). It turned out to be paired with the conceptual image of 
дорога, путь, транспорт (‘roads’, ‘streets’, ‘transport’). The opposite use 
of this metaphorical model, presented in opposition media, is казахстанское 
бездорожье (‘roadless Kazakhstan’). There is a strikingly prominent use of 
metaphors with the same conceptual meaning, and describing the same events, 
but with different evaluative connotations embodied in them. Thus, the ‘mech-
anistic’ metaphor: государство – это механизм (‘a state is a mechanism’), 
one of the basic ‘centennial’ metaphors, can be filled with either positive or 
negative content, depending on the author's position. In the opposition media, 
for example, the following metaphorical image was used: разбитая машина, 
передние колеса которой проколоты (‘a broken car, the front wheels of 
which are punctured’).
Modern cognitive science has moved from the consideration of individual meta-
phors to the study of metaphorical patterns, i.e. their compatibility. An impor-
tant feature of conceptual metaphor is its “ability to be developed in the text” 
(Chudinov 2004, p. 177). Thus, in the opposition discourse (see, for example: 
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Svoboda Slova, 11.05.2006) the relationship between government and opposi-
tion is presented figuratively with the dominance of one, or often two or three, 
metaphorical models: театр (‘theatre’) and a criminal metaphor. These meta-
phors, along with the basic concept of the political discourse власть (‘power’), 
serve as a means of communication of the parts of the text and ensure the in-
tegrity of its perception: беспредел власти; острые разборки во власти, 
дележ и передел каналов; расправа с политиками (‘criminality of power’, 
‘fierce power struggles’, ‘division and remake of channels’, ‘harsh punish-
ment with politicians’). In accordance with another dominant metaphorical 
model, the behaviour of the authorities toward the opposition is represented 
by developed metaphors: сценарий подавления оппозиции, политический 
триллер, заказной фарс, герой этого фарса, зрители политического 
триллера, роли все расписаны (‘political thriller’, ‘home-madefarce’, ‘the 
hero of this farce’, ‘the spectators of a political thriller’, ‘the parts are dis-
tributed’). As we can see, political life is metaphorically characterised as per-
forming art of one kind or another, with a suggestion of performance genres 
varying according to the different parties; actors, performers, and their roles 
are also mentioned.
Another type of feature, involving quotations, allusions, and other references 
to specific pre-existing texts, can also be seen, and can also be considered as 
a distinguishing characteristic of political sociolects: Слепила из того, что 
было (‘made by sticking together what was at my disposal’, from ‘On the 
President's Address’, Svoboda Slova). Центризберком работает под чут-
ким руководством Администрации президента (‘The Central Committee is 
working under the enthusiastic leadership of the President's administration’, 
Respublica). Время боится пирамид (‘Time is afraid of pyramids’: In Astana 
the Centre of World Religions is in a pyramid-shaped building) – Религиозная 
лошадка, пожалуй, будет порезвее обсешного слона (‘a religious horse is 
likely to be more playful than an OSCE elephant’, Respublica) [...] недавняя 
хозяйка медиа-горы. Тайны акординского двора (‘the recent hostess of me-
dia-hill. The secrets of Ak-Orda Court’, Svoboda Slova).
It is well known that artifacts may appear as political symbols. In the dis-
course of the opposition, artifacts are often used according to the principle of 
contrast: Левобережье Астаны (‘The Left Bank of Astana’), Ак Орда и ал-
маатинский ‘Шанырак’ (‘Ak-Orda’ and Almaty ‘Shanyrak’). Там – блеск 
президентского дворца, зданий парламента, банков, министерств, здесь 
– люди на грани выживания, без газа, тепла и света (‘Over there is the 
splendour of the Presidential Palace, Parliament buildings, Banks and Minis-
tries – here, people surviving, without gas, heating or energy’, Svoboda Slova). 
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In this example, the signifiers relate to deictic orientation, suggesting ‘home 
group’ and ‘other’ in the ‘here/there’ polarity. They help to identify friends and 
foes. The NPs – Левобережье Астаны, Ак Орда, Шанырак (The Left Bank, 
Ak-Orda, Shanyrak) – are mediated symbols of power and people, that is, the 
place itself becomes a symbol as well as its literal designation. The isolation 
from its referents is suggested in the use of this symbol, in the title of the article 
devoted to events in Copenhagen: Шанырак по-датски (Danish Shanyrak, 
Svoboda Slova 9/2007). These artifacts act as passwords, reflecting the most 
significant power symbols of official and opposition sociolects.
This kind of ambiguity is characteristic of signifiers used in political language, 
leading to increased options for interpretation. “Nominative accuracy as a 
property of a special sublanguage of the language policy is suppressed due to 
its pragmatic semantic uncertainty” (Sheigal 2004, p. 49). In political discourse, 
regardless of its ideological orientation, such methods as the obscuring of a 
certain position or opinion, the deliberate concealment of the truth, deliberate 
misleading, and the removal of liability for reports, all lead to semantic uncer-
tainty. Many cases can be accounted for in primarily pragmatic terms, princi-
pal among these being the manipulation of public consciousness.
The ambiguity caused by language operating on different levels, results in 
inaccuracies in its reception, and the lack of clarity leads to the failure of 
the message to convey information. This can be seen, for example, in the fol-
lowing: Говорят, что Вы и N укрылись в каком-то бункере, вооруженные 
до зубов. Прятались где-то в посольстве за границей (‘You and N. are 
said to have hidden in a bunker, armed to the teeth. Hid somewhere in an 
embassy abroad’, Svoboda Slova 31/2009). Они все больше развивают ‘в 
обществе баррикадное мышление’, когда кто-то должен противостоять 
кому-то (‘More and more the society is developing ‘a barricade mentality’, 
where people must always be opposed to each other’, ОRТ 02.03.2009). Но 
нам тоже нужно обращаться не к тому, что какие-то вещи он делал 
правильно, а какие-то неправильно, а что-то вообще сделано очень 
плохо. (‘But we also need to focus on the fact that something was done badly, 
rather than that he did something right or wrong’, Svoboda Slova 31/2009). 
Кто-то, наверное, остался с этим убеждением, а кто-то, наоборот, 
нашел какие-то плюсы в том, что я могу добавить [...] (Someone is cer-
tain to be convinced by it, and on the other hand, someone else will find ad-
vantages in my point of view’, Vremya 81/2009). The uncertainty arises mostly 
because of the desire to avoid semantic accuracy, and not because of the au-
thor's lack of relevant information. This attitude is typical for all political 
actors.
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We can see therefore that ideological orientation, which is the basis of politi-
cal sociolect, determines its linguistic characteristics. The distinctive features 
of different variants of political speech discussed here are all based on opposi-
tional political discourse: ‘свой-чужой’ (‘self -other’) and belong to universal 
features of political discourse.
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